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ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
I. Introduction
On December 31, 1970, the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Acte
were signed into law.' Many people had felt that the Air Quality Act of 1967
was not effective enough to deal with the growing air pollution problem. The
House report accompanying the 1970 Amendments reflected the same concern.'
The Amendments were designed to remedy some of the deficiencies of the 1967
Act.
The purpose of this note is to examine generally the enforcement provisions
of the Amendments as they apply to existing stationary sources (primarily smoke-
stacks). Particular attention will be paid to the plan for implementation de-
veloped by the State of Indiana pursuant to the 1970 Amendments, in that it
serves as an example of the problems involved with enforcement of the Amend-
ments' strictures. Additionally, the problems of local variances and citizen suits
will be examined separately.
II. Indiana Implementation Plan
Section 109 (a) (1) of the 1970 Amendments requires the Administrator
of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
EPA) to establish national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards
by January 31, 1971, covering each air pollutant for which air quality criteria
had been issued under the 1967 Act.5 Ambient air standards are those against
which general overall air quality in a particular area is measured, as opposed
to emission standards which specify the maximum allowable air pollution from
any one point source (smokestack) of emissions. Section 109(b) defines primary
standards as those standards necessary to protect the public health,6 while sec-
ondary standards are those standards necessary to protect the public welfare."
Pursuant to this provision, on January 25, 1971, the EPA proposed nationwide
ambient air standards for the following: particulate matter, the oxides of sulfur
(SO.), carbon monoxide (CO), photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and
nitrogen oxides (NO.).' These standards were amended on March 24, 1971,'
and formally promulgated on April 28, 1971.1 The ambient air standards were
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970).
2 116 CONG. REc. 44641 (1970).
3 See, e.g., Note, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas From
Congress, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L.Rav. 571, 579 (1971). See also 116 CONG. !R.c. 19202
(1970) '(remarks of Representative Farbstein), and O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality
Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 275, 277 (1968).
4 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 5356 (1970) (quoting H.R. RmP. No. 1146, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a) (1) (A) (1970).
6 Id. § 1857c-4(b)'(1).
7 Id. § 1857c-4(b) (2).
8 36 Fed. Reg. 1502 (1971).
9 Id. at 5867.
10 Id. at 8186.
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national in character such that each state was required to achieve the same
overall air quality.
Under section 110(a) (1) of the Amendments each state was to submit by
the end of January, 1972, a plan providing for implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement of each primary and secondary standard within that state.:
The states were allowed to request from the EPA an extension of eighteen months
(until the end of June, 1973) for submission of a plan to implement the second-
ary standards."2 This in effect forced each state to set emission standards,
which, when applied to every existing point source within the state, would have
the effect of improving that state's air quality to the degree necessary to satisfy
at least the primary ambient air standards. These primary standards were to
be met by 1975. 1' As to the attainment of secondary standards, the Amendments
merely required that they be met within a "reasonable time."' 4
Generally, each state developed a plan which set emission standards on a
region-to-region basis, since an area with a heavy concentration of industrial
activity would need more stringent emission standards to achieve the established
ambient air requirements than would an area with a lower density of industrial
activity. The Administrator of the EPA was then required to approve or dis-
approve each plan or portions thereof within four months of the date required
for submission by the states.' 5 In addition, section 111 (b) (1) (B) required the
Administrator to establish emission standards for all new stationary sources so
significantly contributing to air pollution as to endanger the public health and
welfare.' 6 These standards, which apply generally to all such new sources in
every state, were promulgated on December 16, 1971.
Pursuant to these requirements, Indiana submitted its plan for implemen-
tation, The State of Indiana Air Pollution Control Implementation Plan (herein-
after referred to as Indiana Plan), on January 31, 1972,18 and, with the excep-
tion of some provisions, the EPA approved the Indiana Plan on May 26, 1972."8
On July 13 of that year, pursuant to section 110(c) (2)20 of the Amendments,
the Administrator of the EPA proposed additional provisions to the Indiana
Plan where it had been found deficient. 2' At that point, the Indiana Plan was
complete and enforceable with regard to the primary standards. Indiana has
not yet (as of January, 1973) submitted a complete plan for the achievement
of the secondary ambient air standards.
11 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1) (1970).
12 Id. § 1857c-5(b).
13 Id. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i). See n. 108, infra.
14 Id. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (ii).
15 Id. § 1857c-5(a) (2).
16 Id. § 1857c-6(b) (1) (B).
17 36 Fed. Reg. 24876 (1971).
18 37 Fed. Reg. 10863 (1972).
19 Id. at 10863-65.
20 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (2) (1970).
21 37 Fed. Reg. 15100-02 (1972). See text accompanying n. 107 infra, for a discussion





Section 107(a) of the 1970 Amendments states that "[e]ach State shall
have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geo-
graphic area comprising such State ... ."" It has been suggested that the pri-
mary purpose of federal enforcement is only to prod state and local control
agencies into taking action.23 This may in fact be the case in that as of January,
1973, only two thirty-day notices24 (the first step in federal enforcement) had
been issued by the EPA, one on March 8, 1972, to Delmarva Power and Light
Company, located in Delaware City, Delaware," and one on May 28, 1972,
to Allied Chemical Company of Claymont, Delaware." Other than these orders,
federal action under the 1970 Amendments in relation to stationary sources
has been essentially limited to the establishment of standards and the approval
or disapproval of state implementation plans.
Despite the contrary implication, however, the federal government through
the EPA does have significant enforcement powers. Under section 113(a) (1)
of the 1970 Amendments, where the EPA finds a person violating any provision
of an applicable state implementation plan, it notifies both that person and the
state of its finding. If such a violation continues for thirty days after notice
is given, the EPA can issue a compliance order or bring a civil action for a
permanent or temporary injunction.28 However, according to section 113 (a) (4),
if such an order is issued, it cannot take effect until there has been a conference
between the EPA and the alleged polluter concerning the violation.2" Section
113(b) (1) provides that if the EPA does issue an order and such an order is
violated, the EPA can again commence a civil action for a permanent or tem-
porary injunction, this time, however, without the thirty-day notice require-
ment.30
Under section 113(a) (2) of the 1970 Amendments, if the EPA finds that
a state has failed to enforce its implementation plan effectively, as evidenced by
widespread violations, the federal agency shall notify the state of such a finding.3
If the state's failure to enforce continues for thirty days after such notice, the
EPA shall give public notice of the existence of a "period of federally assumed
enforcement."3 2 Such a period continues until the state satisfies the federal
agency that it will enforce its own plan. During such a period the EPA can
enforce that state's plan by issuing compliance orders or by bringing civil
actions. 4 The notion of creating a "period of federally assumed enforcement"
22 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (1970).
23 J. DAviEs, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 186 (1970).
24 See text accompanying n. 27, infra.
25 4 CGH CLEAN AiR & WAER NEws 141 (1972).
26 Id. at 333.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (1) (1970).
28 Id.
29 Id. § 1857c-8(a) (4).
30 Id. § 1857c-8(b) (1).






seems consistent with the suggested philosophy of the Clean Air Amendments.
They are designed to prod state and local governments into action. 5 While the
EPA has the power to enforce any requirement of an applicable state plan
against any person without calling for a "period of federally assumed enforce-
ment," it calls for such a period to rouse state and local action. The period
may appear to be repetitive in that it provides the EPA with no additional
significant powers. Construed in light of the underlying philosophy of the Act,
however, this alternative appears both useful and proper.
Section 113(c) (1) of the 1970 Amendments empowers the EPA to bring
criminal prosecutions against persons who, after the first thirty days of federally
assumed enforcement, knowingly violate any requirement of an applicable im-
plementation plan'6 or knowingly fail to comply with an order issued by the
EPA.3T
The EPA also has broad discretionary powers under section 114(a) (1)
of the 1970 Amendments to require the owner or operator of any emission
source to maintain records of emissions, to make reports, to install and use
monitoring equipment, and to sample emissions." Section 114(a) (2) gives the
EPA an explicit right of entry to premises where any emission source is located
or where required records are maintained. 9 Under 114(a) (2), the EPA also
has the right to have access to and copy required records, inspect any required
monitoring equipment, and sample any emissions which the owner or operator
is required to sample.
4 0
These federal powers raise two problems: 1) the EPA's power to require
maintenance of records, the making of reports, the installation of sampling equip-
ment and the sampling of emissions is completely discretionary, meaning that if
the EPA does not order the keeping of such records and reports, a private citizen
bringing an action under section 304VI of the Act may have to do his own costly
testing of emission sources; 2) the disclosure requirements and the right of entry
may raise some fourth and fifth amendment problems. The second problem
deserves further comment.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be raised,
because in a criminal action the EPA may want to introduce as evidence records
which the owner or operator was required to maintain. Since most polluters
are corporations, however, and since the Supreme Court has consistently held
that a corporation has no fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
such a claim should not be very significant.4' Also likely to be raised is the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. While an
individual could suppress evidence obtained during an unreasonable search or
35 See text accompanying n. 23, supra.
36 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c) (1) (A) (1970).
37 Id. § 1857c-8(c) (1) (B).
38 Id. § 1857c-9(a)(1).
39 Id. § 1857c-9(a)'(2) (A).
40 Id. § 1857-9(a)(2)(B).
41 Id. § 1857h-2. See text accompanying n. 77, infra.
42 See, e.g., Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1967) and United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
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seizure, a corporation generally cannot.4 As such, the fourth amendment poses
few, if any, problems in the enforcement of the 1970 Amendments.
A final means of federal enforcement remains. Section 115 of the 1970
Amendments retains most of the lengthy conference procedure which requires
participation by the EPA, the air pollution agencies of the states and munici-
palities involved, and any interstate air pollution control agency involved as
provided for in the 1967 Act." This lengthy procedure has been sufficiently
outlined elsewhere s and will not be discussed in detail here. It was successful
in only one reported case," and even there abatement was achieved only after
fifteen years of attempts to stop the pollution.4 However, section 115(b) (4)
of the 1970 Amendments provides that a conference may not be called with
respect to an air pollutant for which a national primary or secondary ambient
air quality standard is in effect,48 indicating that the conference procedure will
be used only infrequently in the enforcement by federal authorities of the 1970
Amendments.
IV. State and Local Enforcement in Indiana
The Indiana Air Pollution Control Board (hereinafter referred to as the
APO Board) was established in 1961 by the Indiana Air Pollution Control
Law4" and is the principal agency charged with enforcing the Indiana Plan. 0
The APO Board has the general power and authority to:
(1) Make investigations, consider complaints and hold hearings.
(2) Enter such order or determination as may be necessary to effectuate
the purposes of [the Indiana Air Pollution Control] Act....
(3) Adopt and promulgate reasonable rules....
(4) Bring appropriate action to enforce its final orders or determina-
tions .... 51
The Indiana Plan indicates that the primary responsibility for control is at the
state, not local, level.52 It states as a general policy that "[w]hile local enforce-
ment activity is to be encouraged, such authority should be concurrent with,
and not in lieu of, state authority.""3 Consistent with this policy, the Indiana
43 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). In the two decades
since that decision, the Supreme Court has not altered its position. See generally K. DAVIS,
ADMSINISTRATIVE LA-v TEXT § 3.03, at 56 '(3d ed. 1972).
44 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (1970).
45 See, e.g., Note, The Federal Air Pollution Program, 1968 WASH.U.L.Q. 283, 304-07.
46 United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970). cert. denied,
398 U.S. 904 (1970), .zff'g 287 F. Supp. 624 (D.C. Md. 1968).
47 This particular series of events is fully described in J. EsPosITo, THE VANISHING AIR
114-17 (1970).
48 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(b)'(4) (1971).
49 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-4601 to -4610 (Supp., 1972), amending IND. ANN. STAT. §§
35-4601 to -4608 (1969).
50 See generally, 2 STATE OF INDIANA Am POLLUTION CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
§ 7, at 7-1 to 7-8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as INDIANA PLAN].
51 Id. § 7.6, at 7-4. These powers are all included in the Indiana Air Pollution Control
Law.




Plan provides: "Local political subdivisions only have such powers as granted
by statute, and state agencies such as the APO Board retain superior jurisdiction
notwithstanding local programs." 54
In addition to its superior position, the APO Board has broad emergency
powers." Since the emergency situation is the exception rather than the rule,"
however, it will not be discussed here, although in certain circumstances it could
be an extremely important power.
Since, as has been mentioned above, most enforcement will take place on
the state level, adequate funding of the APC Board is essential to enforcement
of the 1970 Amendments. The Indiana Plan states that up to the date of the
submission of the plan, the APO Board was "limited by financial and manpower
resources."57 It goes on to note that the "manpower model predicts the need
for a 130 man-year effort by the local agencies and a 124 man-year effort by
the state agency, or a total effort of 254 man-years .... These manpower esti-
mates . . . seem somewhat excessive in practice. . . . The modified estimates
predict the need for a total of 168 man-years of effort for the entire state by
1975."'  Considering this sizable increase from 71.5 man-years in 1971"9
and assuming expertise and good faith on the part of the APO Board in de-
veloping these figures, it must be concluded that air pollution control success
depends largely upon sufficient funding by the state and its appropriate political
subdivisions, which in turn depends largely upon continued public interest in
air pollution control. At this point in time it is very difficult to prejudge the
success or failure of the manpower estimates. One rather explicit note of
pessissism, however, is contained in the plan itself: "The estimated funding re-
quirements are reasonably close to the projected budgets of the state and most
of the local agencies. Notable exceptions occur in the State budget for [fiscal
year] 1973. ... !" Indiana could very likely have difficulty in enforcing the
plan if the above statement is intended as an advance apology for not only
1973, but also for later years. Insufficient funding will lead to decreased man-
power, with the likely net effect of decreased enforcement efforts.
Another indication of ineffective state enforcement, or at least an indication
of lack of foresight, is that Indiana plans the establishment of only one stack
sampling team, with the intention to expand to two or three teams in 1973.6
This note will not attempt to go into the details of stack sampling82 other than
to say that it can be very costly and time-consuming, and that even three stack
sampling teams seem to be inadequate.
54 Id. § 7.8, at 7-8.
55 IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4605 (Supp., 1972).
56 For example, the EPA has declared only one emergency since the statute was enacted
(that was in Birmingham, Alabama). 3 CCH CLEAN Am & WATER NEWS 736-37 (1971).
Such emergency powers are likely to be used by the EPA or the APC Board only when en-
forcement is otherwise non-existent or, as happened in Birmingham, an atmospheric inversion
causes a bona fide air pollution emergency.
57 1 INDIANA PLAN § 5.1.1, at 5-1 (1972).
58 Id. § 5.2.2, at 5-3. A man-year is a unit of measurement, being the work of one man
for one year.
59 See id. Table 5-1, at 5-6, and Table 5-3, at 5-10.
60 Id. § 5.3, at 5-3 (emphasis added).
61 Id. § 6.2(d), at 6-3.
62 See generally 2 A. STERN, AIR POLLUTION at 495-528 (2d ed. 1968).
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Although subordinate to the state's powers, enforcement at the local level
likely will not be insignificant, especially where a state has not taken any action.
Therefore, local enforcement powers should be examined in at least general
terms. At the time the Indiana Plan was written, three Indiana counties (Lake,
St. Joseph, and Vigo), and seven cities (Anderson, East Chicago, Evansville,
Gary, Hammond, Indianapolis, and Michigan City) had air pollution ordi-
nances. 3 All the ordinances are substantially alike in their provisions. Section
102 of the Lake County Air Quality Control Ordinance is typical of the other
ordinances and presents a general summary of the provisions contained in all:
Purpose. This ordinance is designed to control air pollution by establishing
the Division of Air Pollution Control within the Lake County Health De-
partment and prescribing the duties of the Administrator of Air Pollution
Control, empowering investigation and abatement by the Administrator
of violations of this ordinance, providing for an air pollution control
advisory board, providing for an air pollution control appeal board, provid-
ing for registration of air pollution sources, providing for inspections and
tests of process, fuel-burning, refuse-burning, and control equipment, estab-
blishing limitations upon the emission of air pollutants, declaring emissions
which do not meet such limitations to be unlawful and a public nuisance,
prohibiting certain acts causing air pollution, providing for fines and penal-
ties for the violation of the provisions of this ordinance, and providing for
just and adequate means by which the provisions of this ordinance may be
executed."
V. Variances
The enforcement scheme of the Indiana Plan in conjunction with the
federal Clean Air Amendments appears to provide a satisfactory means of air
quality control. The power and ability of the local, state, and federal govern-
ments to promulgate and enforce regulations and standards appears quite com-
prehensive. Thus, an adequate air pollution abatement program seems presently
to exist. However, the existence of a necessary evil, the variance, carries with it
the potential of making enforcement much more difficult. Some form of vari-
ance from established standards is necessary due to the myriad possibilities in
which grave injustice could result were a particular emission source forced to
shut down. Despite good faith efforts to comply, a polluter unable to meet the
applicable standard could be forced to leave great numbers of people unem-
ployed. For this reason, a certain amount of divergence from established stand-
ards is allowed depending on the circumstances. A problem arises, however, be-
cause of the great potential for abuse. Some writers see little difficulty with the
variance procedure. 5 But it would be naive to assume good faith in every case
and to ignore the reality of external pressure exerted on variance-granting boards
in the state, especially at the local level. The attitude preferred from a conser-
vationist's point of view is that of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
63 2 INDIANA PLAN § 7.8, at 7-9 (1972).
64 Id. at B7-2 to -3.
65 See Note, State Regulation of Air Pollution, 1968 WAsHr.U.L.Q. 249, 257.
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which states that "if a variance were granted every time it cost money to comply
with the pollution laws, nearly everyone would qualify."6
A second problem, ancillary to the pressure factor, is the wording of the
variance statutes and regulations. For example, one study of twenty-six imple-
mentation plans prepared in compliance with the 1970 Amendments showed
that nineteen of those plans allowed variances on such loosely defined grounds
as hardship and technical or economic infeasibility, without regard to whether
the granting of a particular variance would prevent the reaching of national
air standards or not." The St. Joseph County (Indiana) Air Pollution Control
Ordinance provides a good example:
SECTION 7.1-Variance Where emission sources in existence prior to the
effective date of this ordinance do not comply with the emission limitation
standards of Article V, a program to comply with such standards shall be
developed and presented to the Health Officer by the owner or operator of
the equipment, device or premises causing the emission. Such program shall
be submitted upon the request of and within the time limit as shall be
fixed by the Health Officer... [and] the owner and operator of such equip-
ment..., shall not be in violation of this ordinance so long as such program
is followed. In evaluating such program, the Health Officer shal take into
consideration the following:
(a) efficiency of any existing control equipment .
(b) temporary or interim control measures ...
(c) the effect the emission has on pollution generally...
(d) the degree of control in relation to other similar sources which
produce pollution; and
(e) the age and prospective life of the source in question.
Reports indicating the progress .. . shall be submitted [semi-annually] to
the Health Officer by the owner or operator. . . . If progress under the
program is deemed by the Health Officer to be in violation of such pro-
gram, the Health Officer may suspend the program and issue a violation
notice and order. Such variances shall be for a period of time not in excess
of three (3) years.
SECTION 7.2-Special Variances The Health Officer shall have authority
to grant special variances.... Such special variances shall be for a period
of time not in excess of one (1) year. The only reason for granting such
special variances is the following:
(a) the emissions occurring or proposed to occur do not endanger or
tend to endanger human health or safety, and
(b) compliance with this ordinance would produce serious hardship
without equal or greater benefits to the public.
68
The power to grant a variance, in particular a "special variance," in the hands
of a health officer subjected to industry pressure could be quite deleterious to the
entire plan for the region, especially because the ordinance says nothing that
66 Environmental Protection Agency v. Lindgren Foundry Co., EPA No. 70-1, at 5 (II.
1970) as cited in Comment, The Illinois Environmental Protection Act-A Comprehensive
Program for Pollution Control, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 361 (1971).
67 Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., Ser. H31, pt. 1, at 45'(1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
68 2 INDIANA PLAN D7-23 to -24 (1972).
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would prevent year after year renewal of such variances. What adds to this
problem is the questionable status of checks on the variance-granting power. A
citizen or citizens' group could sue to enjoin the variance, but only if they could
demonstrate standing on their part and abuse of discretion on the part of the
health officer. Quite likely, as long as the emissions considered alone did not
endanger "human health or safety," citizen plaintiffs would be heavily burdened
in establishing abuse of discretion in the granting of a special variance. This
could even mean that where an aggregate of several emissions, all from sources
holding special variances, was a threat to human health or safety, but no one
source by itself constituted such a threat, proof of abuse of discretion on the part
of the health officer would still be difficult. The official, by meeting the ordinance
requirements in granting a number of special variances would not be acting im-
properly because nowhere do the requirements for the granting of a special
variance make any reference to consideration of the effect the emission has on
pollution generally.
It is not entirely clear whether the state AP Board has the power to over-
rule a local variance, although there are certainly arguments supporting that
position. The Indiana Air Pollution Control Law, section 4(A) (2), empowers
the APO Board to act "[i]f the control board shall find that the condition of air
pollution exists... [in which case it may take] such action as is indicated by
the circumstances to cause the abatement of such condition." 9 Further, section
5 gives the Governor the power to proclaim the existence of an air pollution
emergency and to "order all persons causing or contributing to the air pollution
to reduce or discontinue immediately the emission of air contaminants." 70 While
such emergency proclamation seems quite extreme, the APO Board, nonetheless,
appears to have a statutory power to correct abuses in the granting of variances
by simply determining under section 4(A) (2) that a "condition of air pollution"
(a term not defined in the statute) exists. On the other hand, the holder of
the variance could use the language of section 8(e) to argue that the state board
has no jurisdiction:
When an air quality jurisdiction, or administrator thereof, fails to enforce
the local ordinance which affords protection to the public equal to that
provided by state law, the control board . . . may take such appropriate
action as may be necessary to enforce applicable provisions of state law.71
The alleged polluter could claim that the local ordinance was in fact being en-
forced since the variance procedure is explicit in the ordinance. However, this
argument would likely fail because the language seems clearly to add to the
powers conferred upon the APC Board in section 4, and not to limit those powers
in any way.
Another possible way of negating the effect of the variance improvidently
69 IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4604(A) (2) '(1969). This statute is included in the implementa-
tion plan at 2 INDrANA PLAN A7-5 (1972) (emphasis added).
70 IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4605 (1969), as amended, IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4605 (Supp.,
1972).
71 Id. § 35-4608(e).
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granted would be a civil action for nuisance. 2 Despite compliance with the
local ordinance through the variance procedure, it is not clear that the nuisance
action is precluded. On this matter, Prosser has written:
In general, it may be said that there is a [legislative] power to authorize
minor interferences with the convenience of property owners, but not major
ones, unless the land is condemned and compensation given under the law
of eminent domain.73
In such a context a variance seems dearly an authorized interference, and not
merely a failure to prohibit. This indicates a strong possibility of maintaining
the nuisance action in such a situation, assuming, of course, that the other ele-
ments of nuisance can be proved.
There is language in section 110(f) (1) of the 1970 Amendments which
has led some to believe that the EPA must approve all variances. 4 That lan-
guage is:
Prior to the date on which any stationary source . .. is required to comply
with any requirement of an applicable implementation plan the Governor
S.. may apply to the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such
requirement to such source ... for not more than one year.75
The legislative history indicates that section 110 allows a governor to apply for
a one-year extension of the "period for attaining a standard."7 6 The fnal lan-
guage of section 110(f), however, clearly appears to specify that the governor
is required to apply to the Administrator for a time extension for compliance
by a particular emission source only if that source would otherwise be in violation
of an applicable implementation plan requirement. In obtaining the variance,
the emission source has clearly complied with the implementation plan as the
variance procedures are explicitly set out in the plan. Hence, in such a situation,
it does not appear that any approval from the Administrator of the EPA would
be required.
Nonetheless, in summary, it can be said that despite the fact that variance
procedures certainly have the potential of creating problems, there are a few
possible alternative routes by which the emission standard could still be enforce-
able against a particular source notwithstanding the variance: citizens alleging
abuse of discretion could sue to enjoin the variance; the state APC Board argu-
ably has the power to overrule a local variance; citizens could sue the polluter
on a general nuisance theory; and, as will be described next, citizens could bring
suit against the polluter using the citizen suit provision of the 1970 Amendments.
VI. Citizen Suits
Perhaps the most important provision of the 1970 Amendments is section
304, the citizen suit provision, which reads:
72 See text accompanying n. 77 and following, infra, for further discussion of citizen suits.
73 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTs § 91, at 607 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
74 1972 Hearings pt. 1, at 45-46.
75 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1) (1970) (emphasis added).
76 H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 '(1970) (emphasis added).
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[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-
(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limi-
tation, or
(2) against the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an
emission standard or limitation, or such an order .... 7
Section 304 further requires that such plantiffs give sixty days' notice of the
violation and intention to file suit to the Administrator, state, and alleged vio-
lator,"' but if the Administrator or state has already commenced a civil suit or
does so within that sixty-day period that citizen cannot bring such an action."
Even then, however, the citizen can intervene as a matter of right in any action
which has been brought in a federal (but not state) court."
On the part of industry, especially, there is great opposition to citizen suits,
and the following comment seems fairly typical of industry's attitude: "By en-
couraging private and class suits against industry, government control agencies
have opened up a Pandora's box of problems for industry."' On the other
hand, substantial rationale for such suits has been expressed by Senator Muskie
in Senate hearings preceding the adoption of the 1970 Amendments: "I know
one of the things industries don't like is this public participation. I would like to
give it the blessing of national legislation by writing it into the law." 2
One drawback of section 304 is that it does not specifically allow suits for
damages in the federal courts. Some have taken this to mean that citizen suits
are limited in the federal courts to actions for injunctive relief.83 In speeches on
the floor of the Senate, both Senator Muskie, who introduced the 1970 Amend-
ments, and Senator Hart expressed their intentions that the Amendments not
allow for damage suits." Whether or not damages can be sought in federal court,
section 304(e) also provides that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person . . .may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief.... .""
This language can be interpreted as both permitting and denying suits for
damages in federal courts. The argument against such suits is simply that Con-
gress has provided for injunctive relief in the federal courts, and that section
304(e) is Congress' way of saying that it intended that damage suits be tried in
77 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
78 Id. § 1857h-2(b) (1) (A).
79 Id. § 1857h-2(b)(1)(B).
80 Id.
81 Farrell, Let the Polluter Beware, 75 CA'SE & Com., No. 5, 3, at 5 '(1970). Mr. Farrell
is Vice President and General Counsel of Standard Oil Company (Indiana).
82 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 152 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
83 Note, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas From Congress,
12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav. 571, 614 (1971).
84 116 CONG. REc. 33102 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie); id. at 33104 (remarks of
Senator Hart).
85 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) (1970).
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state courts. On the other hand, since section 304(e) contains the language
"under any statute or common law"" an argument could be made that under a
recent Supreme Court case, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee," federal common law
could be applicable, thereby keeping the action in federal court. In Milwaukee,
the Court said that "[w]hen we deal with air and water in their ambient or inter-
state aspects, there is a federal common law... -"' The Court went on to say:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in
time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that
comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of
the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution. While
federal law governs, consideration of state standards may be relevant.89
It could be, and certainly will be, argued that this language applies to air pol-
lution as well as water pollution and that the joinder of a damage claim based
on federal common law as to nuisance caused by air pollution with an injunctive
action (or by itself) is wholly proper under Milwaukee.
There are two other substantial arguments supporting federal jurisdiction
over both the injunctive relief action and the damage action. One is the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine, the other is one based on public policy considerations.
"Pendent jurisdiction" means that the original jurisdiction resting under a
federal claim extends to any non-federal claim against the same defendant.90
In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,91 the Court laid down the con-
ditions that must be met before pendent jurisdiction will attach:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts
to hear the whole.92
The court also warned that pendent jurisdiction was strictly a doctrine of discre-
tion.
93
Under United Mine Workers, then, a plaintiff could try to join his federal
injunctive relief action with his state action for damages based on nuisance, and
argue that: (1) the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of
section 304; (2) that the federal and state claims derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact (in fact, from the same facts); and, (3) that the court should
exercise its discretion and hear both actions.
Another line of argument for asking a federal court to grant damages comes
86 Id. '(emphasis added).
87 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
88 Id. at 103 (footnote omitted).
89 Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
90 BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
91 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
92 Id. at 725 (footnote and citation omitted).
93 Id. at 726.
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from the language used in Bell v. Hood." In that case the Supreme Court held
that federal tribunals should "adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief"95 where federally secured rights are invaded. The Court further held that:
[W]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for
a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done.96
The Court has reaffirmed this recently in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents."7 Both Bell and Bivens involved damage actions following illegal searches
and seizures. However, in a 1964 case s the Court went beyond the illegal search
and seizure situation and extended this rationale to a civil action based on viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act, indicating the Court's willingness to give
the doctrine a broad application.
To maintain a claim for damages in a federal court under the Bell rationale,
it would be necessary to argue that section 304 proclaims that freedom from air
pollution is a "federally secured right" by the fact that a citizen can enforce it;
further, that this right has been invaded and violated by the alleged polluter; and
finally, that money damages, in addition to an injunction, are necessary to "make
good the wrong done."
There are several other interesting aspects of section 304. While the other
enforcement sections talk in terms of "violation of any requirement of an appli-
cable implementation plan,"99 section 304 requires only an allegation that a
person is in violation of an emission standard."' Later in the same section this
language is defined:
The term "emission standard or limitation under this chapter" means--
(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation, standard of
performance or emission standard.., which is in effect under this chapter
... or under an applicable implementation plan.10'
The language opens up several possibilities. Two are especially important. If a
person is suing for injunctive relief only, and not damages, then it appears that
he need only show a violation of the standard, and need not prove nuisance or
harm, real or potential, at all. The second important, perhaps vital, aspect of
this language relates to the variance problem discussed earlier 0 2 It would be
arguable that a citizen could bring suit, show that the emission standard was
violated, and win at least injunctive relief (and possibly damages also under a
94 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
95 Id. at 684.
96 Id. '(footnote omitted).
97 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
98 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
99 See, e.g., section 113(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
100 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1) (A) '(1970). See text accompanying n. 77, supra.
101 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(f) (1970). Particular attention must be paid to the disjunctive
language: "timetable . . [or] emission limitation, [or] . . . standard of performance or emis-
sion standard."
102 See text accompanying n. 67, supra.
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nuisance action) even if the alleged violator had obtained a variance from the
local governmental unit. The defense, quite obviously, would be that the de-
fendant had justifiably relied on the variance, and that, although he was techni-
cally in violation of the promulgated emission standard, the standard was differ-
ent for him because of the variance. However, both the general rule previously
discussed concerning nuisance ("there is a [legislative] power to authorize minor
interferences with the convenience of property owners, but not major ones")' 03
and the specific disjunctive language of section 304 considerably weaken that
defense. A very strict reading of section 304 clearly suggests that, notwithstand-
ing the variance, a citizen could sue a polluter on the grounds that an emission
limitation was being violated.
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of section 304 is that a federal court
is authorized, in its discretion, to award costs of litigation, including attorney
and expert witness fees, to any party.1' 4 This should have two primary effects.
First, it encourages bona fide citizen suits by offering at least the prospect of re-
covering costs, if not damages. Expenses in this type of litigation can be pro-
hibitively high. One estimate has been made that the cost of such a suit could
exceed $500,000.0' Second, it discourages frivolous suits, as costs could be
awarded to a successful defendant in such a case. One feature of the 1970
Amendments that could easily decrease the cost of bringing a citizen suit is the
fact that if the Administrator exercises his section 114 powers0 0 by ordering an
owner or operator of a source to maintain records and make reports, these records
are then available to the public for inspection.' This will be helpful, of course,
only if the Administrator does exercise his discretion to make such an order, and
the would-be plaintiff believes the data to be correct.
VII. Conclusion
Although the 1970 Amendments are now well over two years old, their
major impact may not be felt until well into 1975, the year by which the states
are required to have met the national primary ambient air quality standards as
promulgated by the EPA.' To better effectuate and implement the congres-
sional desire for cleaner air as expressed in the 1970 Amendments, Congress and
the EPA should consider two further steps.
First, the EPA, under its powers to require revisions in state implementa-
103 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF To.Ts § 91, at 607 (4th ed. 1971). See text at n. 73,
supra.
104 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970).
105 1970 Hearings pt. 4, at 1199.
106 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(a)(1) (1970). See text accompanying n. 38, supra.
107 See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 15100 (1972) (requiring the public availability of emission data
recorded from sources in Indiana).
108 Section 110(a) (2) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A)'(i) (1970), requires that the
state implementation plan provide for the attainment of primary standards within three years
of the approval by the EPA of that plan. Indiana's plan for implementation was approved in
most major aspects on May 31, 1972, thus making Indianas target date May 31, 1975. 37 Fed.
Reg. 10863 (1972). Section 110(a)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(ii), re-
quires that the secondary standards be attained only in a "reasonable time."
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tion plans as provided by section 110(a) (2) (H) (ii) of the 1970 Amendments0 9
should make a careful re-examination of the various state and local provisions
allowing for variances. Where the Administrator perceives a potential capacity
for abuse, he should require the states to revise their plans so that they will be
able to prevent any abuse.
Second, Congress should carefuly consider whether or not enforcement
could be better insured by explicitly amending the citizen suit provision in order
to allow actions in federal courts for damages against violators. Of course, this
consideration could be rendered moot if the courts do allow such actions for
damages as the cases come before them.
In taking these two steps, the Congress can better effectuate its manifest
desire to clean up the air and at the same time remove some of the ambiguities
in the present law. Paul F. Jones
109 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (H) (i) (1970).
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